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GATES’ BIDDING MODEL 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In evaluating closed-bid competitive procurement auctions, the most crucial issue is to 
determine the probability of placing a winning bid for a given mark-up level.  There has long 
been disagreement on how this should be done due to the absence of a mathematical 
derivation of one of the main evaluation techniques – Gates’ method.  Gates’ method is 
shown in this paper to be valid if, and only if, bids can be described using the proportional 
hazards family of statistical distributions.  When mark-up values are included in Gates’ 
method, it is seen that the underlying statistical distribution required for the method to work is 
closely related to the Weibull distribution. Likelihood based methods are suggested for 
parameter estimation and an illustrative example is provided by analysis of Shaffer and 
Micheau’s (1971) construction contract bidding data. 
 
Keywords: Bidding models, Gates, proportional hazards. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As Crowley (2000) has observed, “there has been a lingering, unresolved debate concerning 
two contrasting bid models introduced in articles by Friedman (1956) and Gates (1967) … 
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each model provides an approach to evaluating closed-bid competitive [procurement 
auctions] amongst known competitors … the distinction between the models being in the 
determination of the probability of placing a winning bid”.  The main reason for the 
disagreement has been the lack of a convincing proof of the Gates’ formula, described by 
Gates as being based on a “balls in the urn” model.  Immediately upon publication of the 
Gates paper, Stark (1968) questioned the validity of his model while Benjamin (1969), 
recognising that Gates provides no mathematical proof, attempted to rectify the situation but 
was unable to do so.  Rosenshine’s (1972) later attempt met with equal lack of success as did 
Gates himself (Gates 1976), leading Englebrecht-Wiggans (1980) to reflect that Gates’ model 
appears to be an empirical fit formula that is still without “mathematical justification”. 
 
Most of the bidding literature is concerned with setting a mark-up, m, so that the probability, 
Pr(m), of entering the winning bid reaches some desired level.  Several models have been 
proposed for calculating Pr(m).  Of these, Gates’ (1967) model appears unique in enabling 
Pr(m) to be calculated directly, without the need to specify any underlying probability density 
functions (pdfs).  However, it is argued below that in applying Gates’ method to determine 
Pr(m) one is essentially assuming a Weibull distribution for the bids. 
 
This paper is organized as follows:  First, Gates’ formulation is shown to be correct if, and 
only if, the distributions involved are from the proportional hazards family.    Furthermore, 
for this to hold with the application of a mark-up, the probability density function must be 
specifically Weibull.  Maximum and Rank Likelihood equations are then presented.  Finally, 
an illustrative example is provided using Shaffer and Micheau’s (1971) data. 
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GATES’ MODEL 
 
Let X1, X2, … ,Xk be independently distributed random variables.  If we generate one value, 
i.e., x1, x2, … ,xk from each variable, the probability of xi being the lowest is, according to 
Gates (1967) 
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where ijP  (0< ijP <1) is the probability that xi<xj.  To simplify the notation, we work with  ijO   
(0< ijO <∞ ), where ( ) ijijijjiji PPPPO −== 1 , that is, the odds on xj<xi.  Now, as 1=iiO  by 
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which leads to the useful result that 
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so that all the ljO can be defined in terms of ( )kqOq ,,21 K= .   Now, for any two from k 
variables, from (1)  
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which becomes, from (2) 
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The probability ⋅iP  may be expressed in terms of pdfs (see for example, Skitmore and 
Pemberton, 1994), 
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with survival functions ( ) ( )duufxS
x
jj ∫
∞
= , pdfs ( )xf j  and hazard functions 
( ) ( ) ( )xSxfxh jjj /= , j=1,…,k.  Now a collection of distributions are said to form a 
proportional hazards (PH) family of distributions if  
 ( ) ( ),0 xhcxh jj =  (5) 
for all j=1,…k with some baseline hazard function ( )xh0  and constants 0>jc . If one assumes a 
PH family of distributions for construction bids then from (4) and (5) we see that (3) is satisfied 
with jiij ccO /= . Therefore, Gates’ method correctly determines the probability of placing the 
lowest bid if the collection of bids in a given auction forms a proportional hazards family. In the 
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appendix it will be shown that in a mildly restricted setting, Gates’ method correctly determines 
the probability of placing the lowest bid only for PH families.  
 
The above arguments show that Gates’ method is justified for PH families. One common 
application of Gates’ method is to the calculation of a mark-up multiplier m so that instead of 
placing a bid X1 the bid mX1 is placed. The hazard function of the bid mX1 is ( )mxhm /1⋅ . As 
we are using Gates’ method to determine the probability of lowest bid, the bids mX1, X2, … 
,Xk must also form a PH family for all possible mark-up values. This would require 
 ( ) ( )xhcmxh m 11 / =  (6) 
for all possible mark-up m. Letting  x = 1, mc can be expressed in terms of ( )⋅1h  so that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )./11/ 1111 xhmhhmxh =  (7) 
Finally, setting ( ) ( ) ( )1/ 11 hxhxs =  we have 
 ( ) ( ) ( ),/1/ xsmsmxs =  (8) 
which is one of Cauchy’s functional equations. Assuming that ( )⋅1h  is continuous at some 
point greater than zero, the unique solution to (8) is known to be ( ) axxs =  for some a (see 
proposition 56 of Klambauer (1975) for details). This corresponds to a Weibull  distribution. 
For a Weibull distribution with parameter 0>ω  the hazard function is ( ) ( ) 11 −= ωxhxh .  
Therefore noting the form of hazard for bids mX1 and equations (5) and (1) the probability of 
bidder 1 placing the lowest bid with mark-up m is  
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LIKELIHOOD METHODS OF PARAMETER ESTIMATION  
 
Two parameter Weibull 
 
The pdf. of the 2 parameter Weibull distribution is 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ωω λλλω xxxf −= − exp1  (10) 
with 
 ( ) ( )[ ]ωλxxS −= exp  (11) 
where  0>ω and 0>λ  are shape and scale parameters.  This includes the exponential 
distribution ( )1=ω  as a special case.  With this parameterization of the Weibull distribution 
the odds are given by ( )ωλλ jiijO /= . 
 
To perform maximum likelihood estimation we prefer to work with the log transformation of 
the Weibull distribution which is the extreme value distribution, with pdf 
 ( ) ( )( )σθσθθ −− −= yyyf expexp;  ∞<<∞− y  
with  ( ) ( )( )σα−−= yeyS exp  ∞<<∞− y  
where ( )∞<<∞− θθ  and ( )0>σσ  are parameters, with 1log −= λθ  and 1−= ωσ . 
 
If, for a series of construction contract auctions, xjl is the value of a bid entered by bidder j 
(j=1,…,r) for contract l (l=1,…,c) then, for ( )jljl xy log= , we let ljjl βαθ +=  where 
jα denotes the scale parameter for each bidder and, following Skitmore (1991), lβ  denotes a 
contract datum (nuisance) parameter.  The parameter σ  is assumed common for all bidders 
and contracts. Therefore, jly  has the pdf. 
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  ( )jlzjl ez −exp1σ          ∞<<∞− jly  (12) 
where ( ) σβα ljjljl yz −−= .  So the log-likelihood is: 
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where ∑=
c
l
jljn δ , the number of bids by bidder j, and ∑=
r
j
jlln δ , the number of bids for 
contract l.  By setting σ =1 and solving the α ’s and β ’s by iteration of (13) and (14) provides 
the required maximum likelihood estimates for the exponential distribution .  For the Weibull 
pdf., the parameter estimates can be obtained by solving the α ’s and β ’s by iteration of (13) 
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and (14) for trial σ  values - finding the best σ  using the Newton-Raphson method for (15).  
On completion, the maximum likelihood estimates of the original parameters are then  
1−= σω and ( )( )ijijO ααω −= exp . 
 
 
Rank likelihood 
 
Consider the random variable Yj having the pdf ( ) ( )( )jjj yyyf θθθ −−−= expexp; . Let Xj be 
the random variable such that ( ) jj YXG =  for some monotone increasing transformation G. 
The hazard function of Xj is 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )jxGxG θ−⋅′ expexp  (16) 
It is known that for any given hazard function a function G can be determined so that all PH 
families may be obtained from transformations of families of extreme value distributions. In 
particular, note that for ( ) ( )xxG logω=  one obtains the family of Weibull distribution with 
shape parameter ω . Now suppose that the transformation G is completely unknown. In this 
case all information in the data is contained in the ranks, i.e. precise values of bids do not 
contain information on the parameters of interest, only their ordering contain information. 
The probability of a particular ordering of the bids is given by (Pettitt, 1986) 
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The rank likelihood for the parameter vector θ  can then be formed 
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where r(l,j) is the bidder label of the j-th ranked bid on contract l and jlδ is the indicator variable 
taking the value one if the j bidder bids on contract l and is zero otherwise. Note that from the 
estimate of θ  Gates formula can be used with ( )ijijO θθ −= exp . 
 
The rank likelihood function can be maximized using a standard numerical method such as the 
Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm. Alternatively standard statistical software can be used to fit a 
proportional hazards model stratifying the data according to contract so that for each contract a 
separate baseline hazard function is fitted. It is important to note that by fitting a separate 
baseline hazard function for each contract there is no need to account for the effect of the 
contract size on the bid distribution.  
 
 
WORKED EXAMPLE 
 
For a worked example, we refer to the data published in a previous paper by Shaffer and 
Micheau (1971).  This comprises all identified bids for a series of 50 sealed bid building 
contract auctions over the period 1965 to 1969.  For the purposes of the example, it is 
assumed that the bids for first 49 contracts are known but only the identity of the bidders are 
known for the 50
th
 contract – Ours, Dick, Leon, Les, Lyle and Rob.  The task, therefore, is to 
estimate the theoretical probabilities associated with each of these being the lowest bidder for 
the 50
th
 contract.  From the above, there are 3 main contending models, comprising (1) the 
exponential, (2) the Weibull and (3) the general PH family. 
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As Gates has pointed out, a reasonable number of bids for previous auctions are required 
from each bidder for the analysis to be carried out.  Here a reasonable number is arbitrarily 
chosen as five – bidders entering less than five bids being assigned to a single pooled group.  
For the Shaffer and Micheau data, only eight bidders have entered five or more bids – ‘Ours’ 
(48 bids), ‘Abel’ (6 bids), ‘Adam’ (6 bids), ‘Alan’ (8 bids), ‘Alex’ (5 bids), ‘Ben’ (6 bids), 
‘Dave’ (5 bids) and ‘Dick’ (5 bids). 
 
 
Gates’ empirical method 
 
For comparative purposes, Gates’ empirical method (1) was used by counting the number of 
winning bids made by a contractor and dividing by the number of attempts.  This approach 
immediately encountered problems with bidder ‘Dick’, who had been the lowest bidder on all 
previous attempts, thus making (1) undefined with at least one 0=jiP .  For this method, 
therefore, the 50
th
 auction was included.  Solving (1) for each bidder then gives a probability 
of  0.132605, 0.631579, and 0.056902 for Ours, Dick and the other bidders respectively. 
 
 
Exponential model 
 
For the exponential model, 1=σ  in (13) and (14).  Taking the log values of all the bids and 
using starting values of all 0=jα  (j=Pooled, Ours, Abel, Adam, Alan, Alex, Ben, Dave, 
Dick), the β  value is calculated for the first auction from (14) as 
 11 
( )34560003259413322480032058283197000319266031550002936000
8
1
1 +++++++=βe
 = 3203337.6 
979704.141 =∴β  
Repeating this for all l=2, …, 49 auctions produces the results shown in the second column of 
Table 1.  These β  values are now inserted into (13) to produce a set of revised jα as shown 
in iteration 2 in Table 2.  These two operations are now repeated until the results of the nth 
iteration are close to the results for the n-1th iteration.  As the Tables indicate, this occurs at 
the start of the 12
th
 iteration. The λ  values are calculated from the final α values, using the 
formula ( )jj αλ −= exp . The probability of each bidder entering the lowest bid for the 50th 
contract can then be calculated from (1) using ( )ijijO αα −= exp , i.e.,  
162981.0
11112310.1012383.11
1
=
+++++
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for each of the pooled bidders – Leon, Les, Lyle and Rob, with 
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012383.1
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123310.1
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for Dick.   
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Weibull model 
 
The Weibull model, leaves σ  to be estimated by (15).  Using starting values of all 0=jα  
and 1=σ  the contract β  values are calculated as before.  These are then inserted into (15) 
and the RHS calculated as 227.578864.  σ  is now set to slightly below unity, the α  and β  
recalculated, inserted into (15) and the RHS recalculated.  The improvement is then used for 
the next trial σ  value of 0.248537, which produces a (15) RHS of 206.460859.  This 
procedure is continued until the RHS becomes zero at which point σ  is 0.067572, i.e., 
ω 14.799046  (Table 3). 
 
Again, the probability of each bidder entering the lowest bid for the 50
th
 contract can then be 
calculated from (1) using ( )( )ijijO ααω −= exp .This gives a probability of 0.098473, 
0.621487, and 0.070010 for Ours, Dick and the other bidders respectively. 
 
 
Rank likelihood method 
 
The rank likelihood approach is a statistically more efficient method of obtaining the 
estimates without introducing additional assumptions on the distribution of bids. The 
parameters were estimated using the coxph function from the Survival package in the open 
source statistical software R which maximizes the same likelihood function. The rank 
likelihood approach still has difficulty with the bidder ‘Dick’ being the lowest bidder in all 
auctions except the 50
th
. Optimizing the rank likelihood and solving (1) the bidder probability 
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are estimated as 0.097031, 0.641756 and 0.065303 for Ours, Dick and the other bidders 
respectively. 
 
Probabilities with mark ups 
 
To be realistic in observing the effects of applying a mark up, it is first necessary to 
reestimate the parameters of the models using the reference bidder’s cost estimates instead of 
bids in the analysis.  Table 4 summarizes the results of this.  (9) is then applied for a series of 
mark-up values using the Weibull and exponential models.   Fig 1 provides the results. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The Weibull distribution was invented by Waloddi Weibull – a Swedish engineer/scientist – 
in 1937 for use as an alternative to the normal distribution in the analysis of life data and is 
particularly adept at modelling the distribution of failures and failure times.  From its early 
days, however, it was apparent to its originator that the Weibull distribution “… may 
sometimes render good service” to a wide range of problems and this has proved to be the 
case today where, in addition to being the leading method in the world of fitting and analysing 
life data, it is used in medical and dental implants, warrant analysis, life cycle cost, materials 
properties and production process control, etc (Abernathy 2000). 
 
The Weibull is also known as the extreme value type III distribution and has been proved to 
be the best model for the time of the first failure of a part with multiple failure modes – 
sometimes known as the ‘weakest-link-in-the-chain’ concept (Gumbel 1958).  It 
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approximates the normal distribution and the Raleigh. The lognormal distribution, however, 
is not a member of the Weibull family and is by far the most significant competitor – the 
lognormal being the best choice for some material characteristics, for crack growth rate and 
for non-linear accelerating system deterioration. 
 
There are many instances of the Weibull being used to model auction bids, including those 
for timber sales (Athey et al 2004; Haile 2001; Paarsch 1992, 1997; Donald et al 1997), road 
construction contracts (Marion 2004a, 2004b; Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2003), oil/oil 
tracts sales (Sareen 1999; Smiley 1980), on-line auctions (Bapna et al 2006), milk delivery 
contracts (Marshall et al 2001), road marking contracts (Elköf and Lunander 1998), stock 
market shares (Wilson 1979) and procurement auctions in general (e.g., Lunander 2002; 
Rothkopf 1969, 1980a, 1980b; Rothkopf et al 2003).  In some cases, the use of Weibull is 
justified solely on the grounds of its flexibility (Marshall et al 2001; Keefer et al 1991; Haile 
2001) and computational convenience (Keefer et al 1991).  In several others, the choice 
occurs as a result of empirical analysis (Athey et al 2004; Bapna et al 2006; Elköf and 
Lunander 1998; Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2003) sometimes in explicit preference to other 
distributions such as the lognormal and Gumbel (Smiley 1980). 
 
To date, there has been little interest in accounting for these empirical results.  An exception 
is Bapna et al (2006), who reason that the ‘weakest-link’ principle applies in their on-line 
consumer surplus study.  “.. we have a set of bids in an auction.  Among the differences 
between each of the bids and the winning price, the surplus is the only positive value, and this 
is the minimum of these differences.  In this sense, the winning/highest bid is the ‘weakest 
link’ because it has the smallest distance from the price compared to all the other bids that 
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were placed in auction” adding that “the surplus divided by price also follows a Weibull 
distribution” (p.25). 
 
In fact, little has been said to account for any of the models using in bidding in terms of 
statistical bid generating mechanisms.  A normal distribution, for example, is likely to be 
appropriate if the difference between firms’ total cost estimates is a summation of a large 
fixed number of individually small item estimation differences.  Similarly, two possibilities 
are immediately obvious for the Weibull: 
1. The minimum of any number of independent draws from a Weibull distribution itself has 
a Weibull distribution, and the minimum of draws from any distribution bounded below 
approaches a Weibull distribution as the number of draws becomes large (Rothkopf and 
Harstad 1994, citing Gumbel 1958).  Therefore, in the (usual) situation where the bid is 
based on m subcontracts, for which each have been priced in the main bid at the value of 
the lowest of in ( )mi ,,2,1 K= quotes then, if in is large, the resulting price for subcontract 
i will be approximately distributed as a Weibull random variable. When one of these 
subcontracts (e.g., the mechanical and electrical installation) accounts for the majority of 
the value of the contract then the resulting main bid may still be well approximated by a 
Weibull distribution. 
2. If the number of items, N, contained in the cost estimate is a random variable with a 
geometric distribution having large mean m, and if each of the item estimates have a 
similar distribution with any mean then, from the geometric stability of the exponential 
distribution, the resulting bid formed by ∑ =
− N
j j
Xm
1
1  approximates to the exponential 
distribution (see Gnedenko, 1970). 
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There are possibly other mechanisms which would result in the bid for a contract to be, at 
least approximately, distributed according to a Weibull distribution. Here we have simply 
suggested two such mechanisms. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper provides the mathematical basis of the Gates bidding model, showing it to be 
uniquely associated with the proportional hazards family of pdfs.  When the introduction of 
mark-up values is allowed, only the Weibull distribution holds.  Likelihood based methods 
are proposed for parameter estimation and an illustrative example is provided by analysis of 
Shaffer and Micheau’s (1971) construction contract bidding data.   It should be noted, 
however, that the estimation of the maximum likelihood parameters is rather beyond those of 
hand calculation.  For this example, a computer program was written in Fortran and one of 
the Nag library subroutines used (c05nbf) for the Newton-Raphson iterations.  Though 
seemingly demanding computationally, the actual run time on a standard PC to produce the 
whole of Fig 1 was around 20 seconds in total.  No special software is needed for the rank 
likelihood method, as many standard statistical packages, such as R, are available to perform 
the necessary calculations. 
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APPENDIX 
 
In this appendix we shall show that, under certain mildly restrictive conditions, Gates’ 
method is correct if, and only if, the contract bids are drawn from the PH family of  
distributions. The following simplifying assumptions are introduced: 
A1. There is an infinite collection of bid distributions such that for any subset of k  
distributions, relationship given by equation (3) holds. 
A2. The hazard function of each bid distribution is piecewise constant. For a given bid 
distribution the minimal distance between discontinuity points of a hazard function is 
bounded away from zero. 
A3. The bid distributions have finite mean. 
A4. For every ( ) ∞=> ∑
=
∞→
k
j
j
k
xhx
1
lim,0 . 
Assumption A1 is essentially that Gates’ method correctly determines the probability of a 
bidder placing the lowest bid. That we are assuming an infinite collection of possible bidders 
may be considered as an approximation to reality were there are a large number of possible 
bidders although only a small number will bid on any given contract. Assumption A2 restricts 
attention to piecewise constant hazard function, but it should be noted that any distribution 
can be closely approximated by a distribution with piecewise constant hazard function. 
Assumption A3 is made to simplify the proof and could be removed. The final assumption A4 
does not constrain the behaviour of any individual hazard function but is made to exclude 
certain degenerate behaviour in the collection of distributions.  
 
Theorem: Under assumptions (A1) – (A4), Gates’ method implies the collection of bid 
distributions forms a PH family. 
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Proof: To prove the theorem first we re-write equation (3) as 
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for any ε>x . As the survival functions are decreasing it follows that 
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From equations (20), (21) and applying the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem it 
follows that for any ,0>ε   
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From the mean-value theorem 
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where [ ]ε,0* ∈kx . Taking limits as k goes to infinity we have 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ].limlim *2*121*1*2
0
*
0
*
212112
kkkk
k
k
k
k
xSxfOxSxf
dxxS
dxxSxSxfOxSxf
−=
−
∞→∞∞→
∫
∫
ε
 (24) 
As ε  is arbitrary and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xSxfOxSxf 212112 −  is continuous in a neighbourhood of zero it 
follows that 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).0000lim 212112
0
*
0
*
212112
SfOSf
dxxS
dxxSxSxfOxSxf
k
k
k
−=
−
∫
∫
∞∞→
ε
 (25) 
Combining equations (19) and (25) it is seen that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 00000 212112 =− SfOSf . As the 
hazard functions are piecewise constant ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0212112 =− xSxfOxSxf  for all [ ]1,0 δ∈x , 
where 1δ is the first point of discontinuity of the hazard functions 1h  and 2h . Equation (19) 
may now be written as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) .0
1
3
212112 =






−∫ ∏
∞
=δ
dxxSxSxfOxSxf
k
j
j  (26) 
The above argument is repeated to show that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0212112 =− xSxfOxSxf  for all [ ]2,0 δ∈x , 
where 2δ is the second point of discontinuity of the hazard functions 1h  and 2h . The argument 
continues for all subsequent points of discontinuity and so ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0212112 =− xSxfOxSxf  for 
all x. This last equation can only be true for all x if the hazard functions are proportional. This 
completes the proof. 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS: 
 
Fig 1: Effects of mark-up 
 
Table 1: β  values per iteration (exponential model) 
Table 2: α  values per iteration (exponential model) 
Table 3: α  values per iteration (Weibull model) 
Table 4: Parameters for mark up 
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